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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C. EDWARD BUTT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14353 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Salt Lake County, denying Plaintiff-Appellant injunctive relief and declaring 
Section 23-2-1 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended, 
constitutional and a valid ordinance of Defendant-Respondent City. This appeal was 
brought for the sole purpose of determining the constitutionality and validity of said 
section. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case came on before the Court on a hearing upon Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition 
lor an Order to Show Cause, which hearing was heard and oral arguments presented. At the 
conclusion of the hearing the matter was taken under advrsemenr by the Court pending the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reub n Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
submission of memorandum briefs. The memorandum briefs were submitted and the Lower 
Court, in a Memorandum Decision, ruled in favor of the Defendant-Respondent and 
against the Plaintiff-Appellant granting no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is licensed as a taxicab operator in jurisdiction outside of Respondent City, 
to-wit, Alta, Sandy, West Jordan, Utah, and Salt Lake County. Appellant also has an 
exempt certificate from the Public Service Commission of the State of Utah. A substantial 
portion of Appellant's business results from transporting passengers from the Salt Lake 
City International Airport, which is located within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, to 
the ski resorts of Alta and Snowbird for a fee. Appellant has no Certificate of Necessity and 
Convenience issued by Respondent City, nor does he have any agreement with the Salt Lake 
City International Airport for the conduct of commercial activities at said Airport. 
Respondent requests the Court to find Section 43-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 1965, as amended, constitutional and valid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CITIES HAVE BEEN GRANTED THE POWER, BY 
THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, TO REGULATE TAXICABS 
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE JURISDIC-
TIONS. 
Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, grants cities the power to, "license, tax 
and regulate...cabs and taxicabs, and solicitors therefor;...and drivers of...cabs and 
taxicabs and other public conveyances..." Likewise, city ctreets are under the jurisdiction 
and control of the City. See, section 27-12-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
This Court has repeatedly held that, 
"Where the power 'to regulate' a particular calling or profession is 
conferred on a city, it authorizes such city to prescribe and enforce all 
such proper and reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed 
necessary and wholesome in conducting the business in a proper and 
orderly manner. To 'regulate' therefore implies the right to prescribe 
rules and regulations for the conduct of the businesses regulated." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ogden City v. Leo, 54 U. 556, 182 P. 530, 532, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919). 
See also, Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 U.2d 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942); 
Perry v. City Council of Salt Lake, 7 U. 143, 25 P. 739 (1891). 
Very early in our state's history this Court held, in Perry v. City Council of Salt Lake, 
that under Section 10-8-39 the City Board of Commissioners have a large discretion as to 
whom a license shall be granted. The power to license, tax and regulate carries with it the 
power to limit the number who will be licensed, i.e., that it can be granted to some and not 
to others. 
"Because the council may be authorized to license liquor sellers it does 
not follow that they must license all who may apply." Perry v. City 
Council supra, at P. 741. 
In the Perry case the Court quoted from Crowley v. Christensen, 11 Sup. Rep. 13. 
"There is not inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating 
liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the 
state, or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business 
attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, 
be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as 
will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of 
regulations rests in the discretion of the governing authority. That 
authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the 
power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, 
and to issue license for that purpose." (Emphasis added) 
The Minnesota Court has put forth the proposition thusly: 
"To do business upon public streets is not a matter of right 
like the right of ordinary travel. Nor is the right to carry on 
such a business to be placed upon the same basis as that of 
conducting a lawful occupation upon private property within a 
municipality. The use of public streets for private enterprise may 
be for the public good, but, even so, it is a privilege that may 
be granted, regulated or withheld. ...a municipality having the care 
and control of its streets, and the authority to look to their 
convenient and safe travel, may regulate and even exclude the 
carrying on of a transportation business thereon for private gain, 
or grant the privilege to some and exclude others, since no one has 
a right as of course to carry on a private business upon the public 
street." (Emphasis added) Shultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 68, 
203 N.W. 449, 450 (1925). See also, State v. Palmer, 212 Minn. 388, 3 
N.W.2d 666 (1942). 
Local consent to the operation of a taxicab is a condition precedent thereto. Lertner v. 
Citizens Cab Co. of N. Y., 135 N.J.L. 608, 52 A.2d 687 (1947). 
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Appellant cites Provo City v. Dept. of Bus. Reg., 118 U. 1,218 P.2d 675 (1950), for 
the proposition that Respondent City has no jurisdiction over Appellant's cabs because they 
operate from Respondent City to sites outside of said City. However, that case involves the 
question of who has jurisdiction over controversies involving street and railroad crossings. 
This Court decided, based upon statutory interpretation, that it was the Public Service 
Commission. That case was so decided because the legislature had so legislated. At page 679 
of the Opinion this Court stated: 
''Assuming without deciding that in the earlier acts which we 
have quoted there existed some uncertainty as to whether cities 
had been delegated the authority to deal with street-railway crossings, 
all doubts were removed by the 1917 enactment. It is apparent 
that at that date the legislature recognized that railroad-street 
crossings presented distinct problems not posed by intra city 
operations and that it intended the jurisdiction over them should 
rest with the commission. Because the legislature may have at 
one time authorized the city to control crossings would not 
prevent a subsequent legislature from revoking the grant and vesting 
the authority in a state agency. The wording of the 1917 act 
was so clear and explicit that if it be contended the city had 
been delegated the power prior to that time then the subsequent 
enactment repealed the former." 
In the case at hand, we have exactly the opposite situation as in the Provo case. The 
Legislature has expressly denied the Public Service Commission any right to regulate 
taxicabs that operate within a fifteen mile radius of a city. Section 54-6-12(f), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, specifically provides that no portion of the Motor Vehicle Transportation 
Act (except as to matters not involved herein) shall apply, "(f) to motor vehicles...when, 
used as...licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile radius of the limits of any city..." 
This power is specifically given to cities by Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953. As 
one can readily see, the Legislature has specifically granted to the cities the right to control 
taxicabs operating within the city; thus, the case at hand is clearly distinguishable from the 
Provo case. 
A second case cited by Appellat is Parker v. Provo City, U.2d , 543 
P.2d 769 (1975), which is also clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Parker 
case there was no express grant to cities regarding the subject matter of that case; therefore, 
the Court looked to Section 10-8-61, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (the general grant of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
authority to cities) to see if the right had been granted under that section. It was decided 
that it did not come under that section because it was not indispensable to the purpose and 
objects of the city to prohibit persons from waste removal and that there was no showing 
that it was in any way related to the protection of the public health, safety, welfare and 
well-being; hence, Defendant exceeded its authority by enacting the ordinance in question. 
In the case before this Court there is a specific grant of authority given by Section 10-8-39, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and for that reason there is no need to look to Section 10-8-61 
and this case is clearly distinguishable from the Parker case. 
POINT II 
THERE IS A DIRECT INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC TO 
REGULATE TAXICABS. 
The very purpose of licensing is the regulation of the character and standard of service 
to be performed on city streets. To that end cities may require a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity. It is well recognized that the regulation of the use of the highways for private 
gain rests upon the principle of public convenience and necessity. 
"The principle applied in the regulation of the use of the 
highways for private enterprise rests upon public convenience and 
public necessity, a principle recognized and in a large degree 
applied by the national government in placing the control and 
regulation of the railroads of the country in the hands of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Title 49, 'Transportation,' c.l, 
§ 1, p. 1649, U.S.C. 1936. 
"It was upon this theory and the application of this principle 
that this court in Ex parte Tendall, 102 Okl. 192, 229 p. 125, held that 
the state was within the rightful exercise of its police power 
in the regulation of the use of the highways in sustaining 
the constitutionality of the law here again challenged, and denied 
that if in any wise was a contravention of either the Fourtheenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution as in abridgment of any 
right or privilege of the citizen, or in deprivation of property 
without due process of law." Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okl. 
1227, 259 P. 552, 554, 56 A.L.R. 1049 (1927). 
One of the principal reasons for requiring a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is 
to assure adequate transportation to the public. This is done to assure that competition will 
i :
 av^ccu^ in, thp nnint that no oerson can survive. 
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"Its (requirement of Certificate of Necessity and Convenience) 
purpose is to regulate competition, so that each community will 
have adequate transportation facilities, and yet protect the shippers 
and public from the baleful results of excessive compeititon." 
Cant lay & Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120 U. 217, 233 
P.2d344, 346(1951). 
The requirement for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is also for the purpose 
of insuring that only qualified persons undertake the performance of such services to the 
public, i.e., those who are morally and financially responsible to the protection of public 
welfare. Kramer v. Haley, 250 Or. 87, 439 P.2d 571 (1968). 
The regulation of taxicab business has a direct relation to the safety of citizens within 
a city. This is to insure that the vehicles used in such service are maintained at a sufficient 
safety standard, as well as that the drivers of such vehicles are competent, capable and 
qualified in the operation thereof. 
"One of the principal purposes of our statutes pertaining to 
the regulation of motor carriers of persons and property is 
to have the motor vehicles operated in such a way as to 
promote the safety and welfare of the public." Briggs v. Burk, 
172 Kan. 375, 239 P.2d 981 (1952). 
The efficient and safe operation of taxicabs is a matter of grave concern to the people 
of the city. The regulation thereof and the fixing of rates contributes directly to the 
maintenance of safe standards of service. The state not having occupied this field, 
municipalities may do so in the exercise of police powers. Ex parte Martinez, 56 Cal. App. 
2d 473, 132 P.2d 901 (1942). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM AN ORDINANCE TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BASED UPON SOME HYPOTHETICAL 
CASE OR WHERE IT MIGHT VIOLATE A THIRD PARTIES 
RIGHTS. 
Appellant makes quite a to-do about the City's ordinance being in conflict with and 
repugnant to the Utah Motor Transportation Act (Chapter 6 of Title 54, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953). Appellant's operation is specifically exempted from that Act as previously 
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discussed in Point I. What Appellant is doing is posing a hypothetical case and saying that 
someone else's rights may possibly be violated. This he cannot do. Suffice it to say, that a 
person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a law on the grounds that it impairs the 
rights of others, but must show that it is unconstitutional as to his own conduct or situation. 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 87 L.ed. 603, 63 S.Ct. 493 (1943); Bourjois v. Chapman, 
301 U.S. 183, 81 L.ed. 1027, 57 S.Ct. 691 (1937); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 
L.ed. 2d 393, 81 S.Ct. 1101 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L.ed. 2d 524, 80 
S.Ct. 519 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 97 L.ed. 1586, 73 S.Ct 1031 (1953). See 
also, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 112, 122 and 123, and cases cited therein. 
Appellant does not have a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the 
Public Service Commission of Utah to serve statewide, countywide or indeed to operate 
anywhere except as is granted by a city. 
POINT IV 
REGULATION OF TAXICABS WITHIN JURISDICTION OF CITY 
DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION. 
It is a basic rule of construction that ordinances should be construed and applied as to 
make them constitutional whenever possible rather than the contrary and not to strike down 
any ordinance unless necessary. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 U.2d 256, 
272 P.2d 177 (1954); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 4 L.ed 2d 1435, 80S.Ct. 1367 
(1960). 
There is no constitutional right to use the streets for private gain. ''So far as I have 
been able to discover, the authoriies are overhwelmingly to the effect that he has no 
inherent, no constitutional right to carry on such a business." (Several cases from various 
jurisdictions cited) Cutrona v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 14 Del. Ch. 208, 124 A. 
658, 662 (1924). 
The transportation of passengers for hire upon the streets of the city is not an inherent 
right guaranteed under the constitution, but is a privilege which a city may allow or refuse. 
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Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson, Wis. 2d, 426 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960). The use upon the 
public highways of motor vehicles engaged in transportation for hire may be prohibited, 
restricted, or conditioned by the controlling public authority. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 
U.S. 251, 77 L.ed. 288, 53 S.Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. 
Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 76 L.ed. 1155, 52 S.Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932). 
It is a universally accepted doctrine that the use of the public roads for the conduct of 
business thereon is an extraordinary use, and, as such, is enjoyed not as a right but as a 
privilege. That the state may altogether exclude any hauling by a carrier, common or 
contract intrastate from its roads, is generally taken for granted. Stephenson v. Binford, 
supra. In Peoples Taxicab Co. v. City of Wichita, 140 Kan. 129, 34 P.2d 545, 95 A.L.R. 
1218 (1934), it was held that a city has broad powers to regulate the operation of taxicabs 
upon its streets, and that an ordinance doing so will not be held to be invalid unless it 
appears to be unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. See also, City of Wichita v. Demers, 
117 Kan. 735, 291 P.2d 1106 (1955). There is a distinct difference between the right of the 
citizens to use the streets for the purposes of travel and transportation either for business or 
pleasure in the ordinary and customary manner as discussed by Appellant in his brief and 
the extraordinary right of using the streets for the business of a common carrier for gain. 
The former cannot be prohibited, but the latter can. 
'The streets and highways belong to the public. They are 
built and maintained at public expense for the use of the 
general public in the ordinary and customary manner. The state, 
and the city as an arm of the state, has absolute control of 
the streets in the interest of the public. No private individual or 
corporation has a right to the use of the streets in the prosecution 
of the business of a common carrier for private gain without 
the consent of the state, nor except upon the terms and conditions 
prescribed by the state or municipality, as the case may be. 
The use of the streets as a place of business or as a main 
instrumentality of business is accorded as a mere privilege, and 
not a matter of natural right. " (Emphasis added) Hadfield v. Lundin, 
98 Was. 657, 168 P. 516, 517 (1917). 
The Court further stated, at page 571: 
"/T/he sovereign state has plenary control of the streets and 
highways, and, in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely 
prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution 
of a private business for gain. They (cases previously cited by Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the court) all recognize the fundamental distinction between the 
ordinary right of a citizen to use the streets in the usual 
way and the use of the streets as a place of business or main 
instrumentality of a business for private gain. The former is 
a common right, the latter and extraordinary use. As to the 
former the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter 
it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the 
use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution 
of its business as such is not a right, but a mere license or 
privilege, it follows that the legislature may prohibit such use entirely 
without impinging any provisions either of the state or federal 
Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Hadfield v. Lundin, supra. 
Since the state has a direct interest in the regulation of common carriers, i.e., for the 
protection of its citizens so far as health, safety and welfare are concerned, doing so does 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
"The use of highways by a common carrier is a privilege which 
may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, 
without violating either the due process clause or the equal 
protection clause." In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 
24 (1958). 
To the same effect, see also, Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 69 L.ed. 623, 45 S Ct. 324 
(1925); Holmes v. Railroad Comm., 197 Cal. 627, 633, 242 P. 486 (1925); Escobedo v. State 
Dept. ofMtr. Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1050); Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 
F.2d 1034 (D.C. 1932); Davis v. Commonwealth of Mass., 167 U.S. 43, 42 L.ed. 71, 17 
S.Ct. 731 (1897). 
For an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of regulating taxicabs, see, Ex parte 
Tindall, 102 Okl. 192, 229 P. 125, 130 (1924) and Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okl. 227, 259 P. 
552, 56 A.L.R. 1049 (1927). 
This Court has held that the use of streets for business purposes can be licensed. 
Western Auto Trans, v. Reese, 104 U. 393, 140 P.2d 348 (1943). Therein this Court, at page 
350, stated: 
"The type of business in which appellant is engaged entails a 
use of the highways of the State of Utah in its performance. 
Without the use of the highways it could not carry on its 
business, and when it uses the highways of the State of Utah 
by operating its vehicles thereon for the purpose of transporting 
automobiles it is carrying on business within this state for the 
purposes of the Motor Vehicle Act." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Gilmer v. Public Utilities Comm., 67 U. 222, 247 P. 284 (1926), this Court held that 
in exercise of the police power of the state a municipality can exclude all vehicles 
transporting passengers or property from the streets or can impose such conditions as it 
deems fair and just for such use. Therein this Court said, at page 288, 
'The public streets and highways must necessarily be under the 
control and regulation of the state or its authorized agencies. If 
that be so, then it must follow that the state may regulate 
and control their use by those who seek to use them as 
common carriers for private gain." 
If there were no controls placed upon common carriers, the persons using the streets 
for transportation of persons or property could actually exclude the public from using the 
streets for the purpose intended. 
"We are here dealing with a case where one is using the public 
streets and highways as a common carrier for private gain, 
which streets and highways are constructed and maintained by the 
public, by means of taxation and otherwise. If it be once 
conceded that one may use the public highways for the purposes 
aforesaid without the consent of the state, any number may do 
the same thing, and thus those who seek to use the highways 
for the purposes for which they are intended may be unduly 
hampered in their use of them, or may be driven from them 
altogether." Gilmer v. Public Utilities Comm., supra at P. 288. 
Again in Bamberger Transp. Co. v. Public Service Comm.y 115 U. 274, 204 P.2d 163 
(1949), this Court said that the use of highways by a carrier is subject to regulation and 
control by the state. In speaking of the Gilmer case the Court said, at page 165, 
"It was there held that the state has the right to regulate the 
use of highways, and that no one has an inherent right to 
use the public highways as a private business enterprise. Consequently, 
the use of the highways by a carrier is subject to regulation 
and control by the state. It was also held that when it appears 
to the commission that an increase in a number of trips by 
one carrier will seriously affect the ability of another carrier 
serving part of the same territory or some territory beyond the 
area in question, to render service, the commission may interfere 
to prevent such result." (Emphasis added) 
This case also stands for the proposition that if the financial ability of an authorized carrier 
would be adversely affected, a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity need not be granted 
to a new applicant. 
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POINT V 
APPELLANT DOES BUSINESS WITHIN THE CITY, HE IS 
SUBJECT TO SECTION 23-2-1, REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1965, AS AMENDED, AND RESPONDENT 
HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST TO PROTECT; THEREFORE, 
RESPONDENT CAN PROHIBIT APPELLANT'S BUSINESS 
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
Appellant admits in his Complaint (see paragraph 6, page 2 of the Record) and in the 
facts of his brief that "A substantial portion of plaintiff's business results from transporting 
passengers from Salt Lake City's International Airport which is within the corporate limits 
of Salt Lake City..." See page 1, Appellant's Brief. This is not an occasional or isolated 
incident, but a "substantial" conducting of taxicab business within the City. The City has a 
legitimate interest in the type and character of persons who engage in taxicab business 
within the City, to the extent that they may require a permit even for traveling through the 
City. Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99, 96 L.ed. 775, 72 S.Ct. 502 (1952). A municipality may 
regulate both taxicabs bringing passengers into, as well as out of, said municipality. State v. 
Gamelin, 111 Vt. 245, 13 A.2d 204 (1940). The Gamelin case involved both the situations of 
carrying passengers from a point within the city to a point without, as well as from a point 
outside of the city to one inside. There the court quoted In re James, 99 Vt. 265, 273, 132 
A. 40, 44 (1926). 
"The highways belong to the state (authorities omitted), and 
are subject to the police powers of the state (authority omitted). 
So, too, motor vehicles used as common carrier are subject to 
the same powers, (authority omitted) While a citizen has the 
right to travel upon the highways, and transport his property 
thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, he can acquire no 
'vested9 or 'inherent9 right to use them for commercial purposes. 
The right, common to all, to the use of highways, is the ordinary 
use made thereof, and by no means includes the special and 
extraordinary use of a common carrier for commercial purposes 
or private gain. The latter use the Legislature; in the exercise 
of its police powers, may wholly deny, or may permit it to some and 
deny it to others, as will best promote the general good of 
the public." (Emphasis added) 
Further the Court said, at page 208, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"She benefits regularly from the use of such streets and from 
police protection while within the city. We know of no good 
reason why she in turn should not be subject to regulation by 
license for the protection of the people of Burlington as well as should 
those whose similar business is conducted wholly within the city. 
There is no discrimination against the respondent either in the 
charter or the ordinance, nor does either attempt to regulate 
that part of her business conducted without the city limits." 
A license fee may be charged even though taxicabs are licensed in another jurisdiction. 
Town ofFlemming v. Wright, 225 Ky. 123, 7 S.W.2d 832 (1928). Taxicabs may be denied 
the privilege of picking up fares in a city for transportation to another city or to the county. 
See, Barton v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 214 Md. 359, 135 A.2d 442, 445 
(1957). 
The purpose of certifying taxicabs under a Certificate of Necessity and Convenience is 
to control the number of taxicabs operating within a city. If taxicabs licensed in another 
jurisdiction are allowed to come into the city to pick up passengers without being licensed 
therefor, this would increase by indirection the number of cabs licensed in a city. Further, it 
would be impossible to supervise operation of cabs licensed elsewhere to make sure they 
were up to safety standards as well as all other protections required by the city. As was 
stated in the Barton case, at page 445: 
"Conditions in a congested metropolis, with its concentration 
of people and vehicles, and the foreseeable evils and dangers 
implicit in an excess of cabs, with resulting overeager competition 
for fares, come readily to mind as factors which may have 
led the Commission to limit the number of taxicab permits 
in Baltimore City and to deny additional competitive rights to 
Baltimore County cabs." 
It is true that the Salt Lake City International Airport does generate a substantial and 
lucrative business for taxicabs. It is a very congested area with great concentrations of 
people and vehicles and the competition for fares is great at that facility. Particularly, this is 
true with regard to the very lucrative transportation of persons to the ski resorts. Allowing 
taxicabs licensed in a jurisdiction outside of Salt Lake City to operate at the Salt Lake City 
International Airport would create a situation whereby Salt Lake City would have no Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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control over those taxicabs. Cities outside of Salt Lake City would also have no real interest 
in regulating such taxicabs inasmuch as the majority of their business would be obtained 
from Salt Lake City. Such a city's interest would be in obtaining revenue from the licensing 
fee. Further, persons such as Appellant could and do charge a cut rate fee which results in a 
disarrangement of competitive conditions disadvantageous to the public interest. Appellant 
benefits from the use of the streets, which the City must maintain, and from police 
protection while within the City and should be required to pay a license fee therefor. Such is 
true whether a taxicab company solicites business on the streets or the service is requested 
over the telephone and even though such taxicab's office is outside of the city. See, Chicago 
v. Dorband, 297 111. App. 617, 18 N.E.2d 107, 109 (1938). 
A foreign corporation carrying passengers from a point within the State to a point 
without the State is doing business in the State. Camas Stage Co. v Roger, 104 Or. 600, 209 
P. 95, 99, 104, 25 A.L.R.27 (1922). When a trucking company was hauling sand and gravel 
between Fort Knox and West Point over a route which traversed through Louisville, the 
court held that the City of Louisville could impose a license tax upon such company for the 
use of its streets. Roger v. City of Louisville, 296 Ky. 238, 176 S.W.2d 387 (1943). Such was 
the case, even though the company stated that such hauling would be done over a period of 
only three months. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no merit whatever to Appellant's contention that the City's ordinance is 
unconstitutional. Courts throughout the land have held that a municipality has the right, 
whether through statutory power or through its police power, to regulate common carriers 
within their respective jurisdictions. Appellant conducts a substantial portion of his business 
within the jurisdiction of Respondent City, but claims that he cannot be regulated by said 
City because he is licensed in another city. But, the Respondent has the right to protect its 
citizens to insure adequate and safe public transportation, and it is within its power to do 
so. 
For these reasons, Salt Lake City's ordinance cannot be said to be beyond the power of 
the City to enact, nor can it be said to be unconstitutional. It is plain that the Legislature Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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left the control of taxicabs to the respective cities wherein they are operating. It is further 
obvious that the Legislature intended that the cities be allowed to regulate taxicabs which 
are transporting persons for hire to points beyond the City limits. This is evident by the fact 
that taxicabs operating within a fifteen mile radius of the city in which they are licensed are 
not required to obtain Public Service Commission authority to operate. The intent of the 
legislature could never have been to the effect that taxicabs licensed in one jurisdiction may 
operate in another without being licensed therein merely because that city is within a fifteen 
mile radius of the city in which they are licensed. As can readily be seen, this would allow 
taxicabs to enter a jurisdiction and operate without any controls or regulations whatsoever 
by the city they operate in. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the ordinance of Respondent is 
constitutional and valid. For this reason, it is respectfully requested that this Court so 
declare. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
O. WALLACE EARL 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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